Donald Trump — The New Tony Blair?

Once upon a time the Financial Times, a short time before the elections in the UK, wrote — in a demanding tone — that it is time for a change, seeing Tony Blair and his “Third Way” as a threat to the stability of the kingdom; or, to be more precise, as a danger to a secure capitalist system. Much earlier, that newspaper had reported that the “Third Way” did in fact represent an alternative and, as such, was precisely what ensured the stability of the capitalist system. History does not repeat but looking at the situation in the USA today we see something that looks somewhat similar: The Economist titled these days

Donald Trump must stop soon. His ill-considered conflict risks descending into chaos
(5 mar 2026, alle ore 18:37, Robert Guest at The Economist; https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/03/05/donald-trump-must-stop-soon?etear=nl_weekly_1)

For some it may come as a surprise as earlier the main economic players had been supporters of Trump — in particular Elon Musk played an outstanding role.

There is a theoretical aspect that must be discussed.

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After the hype about The End of History (Fukuyama, Francis, 1992: The End of History and the Last Man; New York: Free Press) proved to be an interesting, though completely wrong, thesis, political science seemed to be in a state of loss, limited on helpless mourning that the patient is still alive and the search for clearly defined new historical constellation, some found hope for a successor: Dan Wang’s Breakneck (Wang, Dan, 2025: Breakneck. China’s Quest to Engineer the Future; Allen Lane as Imprint of Penguin Books).

It is necessary to look at the origin of confusion to gain a clearer understanding. Before history supposedly passed away, there had been a clear confrontation: the world with two poles: the East and the West. Looking at the term pole, we learn

Originally principally in reference to the celestial sphere and the fixed points about which (by the revolution of the Earth) the stars appear to revolve; also sometimes of the terrestrial poles (poles of this world), the two points on the Earth’s surface which mark the axis of rotation. (https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=pole)

And indeed, this means that “the rest” had been negligible, seen as not existing as relevant actor on the global stage, defined only by moving and being moved in relation to one or the other pole. Decisive: each formed a unit, comprising of economic, political, social and cultural factors. This can be said in a global perspective, looking at the geo-political dimension, although these two “blocks” had been internally differentiated and the parameters that characterised the geo-political perspective, could not be applied in a strict sense if we look at the countries on the one or the other side.

The new era meant a shift towards one side, and as global actor The West gained a dominant position. Although this had been a very strong, even dominant position in the political universe, a major problem emerged: speaking of two poles meant to look at an axis that serves as “axis of rotation”. As one pole seemed to be missing, the force to rotate continued to exist we see in consequence that the movement, previously more or less stable — even if only in form of a stable conflict — changes: we now have a movement that changes permanently its direction. One of the central problems is given by the fact that the instability is twofold: • we witness the instability of the entire system (the global political order) and • we witness the instability of the — temporarily — one pole. A paradox is given by the fact that the previous global system with two poles had been in fact a quasi-mono-pol, meaning that the capitalist system had been so strong that it defined the terms and conditions even for its opposing pole — admittedly this is a kind of ideal-typical presentation, not grasping the reality completely and in depth (see Herrmann, Peter, 2010: Globalisation revisited; Society and Economy; Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 32(2010)/2: 255-275; Finnerty, Joe, 2025: The Three Avoids: Closing Remarks by Moderator, Parallel Session 2 Part 2. The 80^thAnniversary of the United Nations: Toward the Universalization of Human Rights, Central South University Human Rights Center, Changsha, China, 18^thOctober 2025; https://www.hrug.legal/?p=810). However, this said, it reflects well the current situation that seeks clarification. As elaborated elsewhere it is misleading to speak off multipolarity (Herrmann, Peter, 2025: Multipolarity and Chinese modernisation — Misconceptions Of The Past, Perspectives For The Future. Presentation in Shanghai, 13.12.2025 on invitation of the world association for political economy and the marxism research institute, SUFE. International Academic Forum: Multipolarization and Chinese Modernization; https://youtu.be/l9De1n3gLFg?si=3Azr-xD-nVFgs2bh)

Predatory Hegemony is coming up as candidate for an explanation. However, although the are good reasons for such reference, some hesitation is recommended: Juxtaposing predatory and benevolent hegemony overlooks that the “alliances” on which the latter relied had been shaped in the same spirit as the strategy of opting out. One may refer to a simple calculation, suggesting a calculation of a comparative advantage:

Relative strength	Expected benefit
competitors/rivals	alliance	isolationist
— — — —	+ + + +	+
— — —	+ + +	+
— —	+ +	+ +
—	+	+ + +
+	+ +	+ +
+ +	+ +	+ +
+ + +	+	+ + +
+ + + +	+	+ + + +

Though a strict calculation will be difficult, the trend is surely captured appropriately. And of course, the balance of power, understood in a relational manner, is permanently changing as a proper reading requires both, a relational and processual take.

Taking this as broad picture, characterising the foundation, various factors are characterising the current situation, that is in general terms characterised by the words that 

crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. (Gramsci, Antonio, 1930: Quaderni del carcere, vol. I: quaderni 1.5; Edizone Critica del Istituto Gramsci a Cura di Valentino Gerratana; Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1975; translation P.H.)

Transition countries

Speaking of transition is not entirely accurate as we are in fact concerned with a transition of economies and politics within countries; this entails, amongst others, the change of the “economic system” and the related mode of regulation, the latter being the establishment of a new statehood. Condition and consequence is also the change of the life regime and the mode of living. The understanding of the theory of regulation that is underlying this interpretation, cannot be dealt with (see e.g. Herrmann, Peter, 2014: Social Policy – Production rather than Distribution. A Rights-Based Approach; Bremen/Oxford: EHV Academic Press). Important is that we are dealing with a process that is characterised by at least three dimensions:

• historical conditions and their reflection, taking the form of path dependency
• adaptation of aspects of the prevailing dominant system
• genuinely new forms

“Developing countries”

The classification of countries as developing had always been problematic and such questioning is today even more important:

The Rostowian model of development is more problematic than ever. As more as development in Rostow’s understanding is becoming real, as more its principle shortcoming (a shortcoming that applies in the same way to the Ricardian take of comparative advantage) becomes obvious: Those takes depend on the non-realisation: as soon as those lagging behind are catching up, the initial argument looses any justification. In both cases this argument is reflecting two principles:

•  The development of underdevelopment
•  If everybody stands on the tiptoes, nobody can see better

Looking at those countries that had been and still are considered to be developing countries should go beyond applying the “old” standards — they are in various ways going back to the colonial rule. Accepting the use of the term “developing” means, accepting that the countries of the “periphery” are exactly that: “periphery” and as such depending on and in their working mode defined by rules set by the “centre”.

New accumulation regimes and changing modes of regulation

The genuinely new forms, that had been mentioned earlier, are themselves characterised by two dimensions: on the one hand they emerge as simple forms of development, i.e. the unfolding of potentials that are already inherent in the existing system; these are technological advancements within the framework of the given productive forces and their regulation in the framework of the given polities; on the other hand in particular new technological developments and the change of polities must be mentioned. The new stage of financialisation, as it characterised especially in the late 1990s/early 2000s is as important as the more recent — and still ongoing change — of technologies in the digital sectors, including artificial intelligence. In both cases, we see as well massive changes as well in the mode of regulation and the areas directly relevant to everyday life. This entails new forms of corruption and equally new forms of legality — with this the search for new mechanisms of negotiation.

Disastrous economic state of capitalism

This “change” of the geopolitical order in combination with the new accumulation regime is caused by and contributes to the dissolution of the deepening of the economic crisis — or should one say crises — of the capitalist economy. While these changes are quasi-global and quasi-universal, the ways the changes appear and the ways of dealing with these developments are different. Some form of path dependency plays a role, considering central aspects of the mode of regulation, namely those that are in fact immediate (part of the) productive forces. Central aspects are the following:

• the property relations, in particular the role of private versus public property — we find the role of SOEs on the one hand and far-reaching processes of privatisation on the other hand;
• decisive is in which way the different sectors are positioned and related to each other — while financialisation can be considered as more or less global phenomenon, it must be analysed whether the financial sector is intended to serve as a regulatory instrument, or whether it is granted the greatest possible independence to develop, and is geared towards its own profitability rather than regulation;
• looking at mechanisms of control means as well to investigate the degree of centralisation — centralisation of political control and (concentration and) centralisation in the productive sphere. Important is to master the balance between the political and economic sphere, i.e. to ensure the performance of the economy (understood as production and reproduction of daily life) which means to take the growth of the economy into account and to avoid that growth becomes a goal in itself;

Contradictions within the Western bloc, particularly within NATO

Challenges of this kind — in particular their multiple and interwoven character — drive a wedge between the once-allied parties. Latest here the question of “border control” comes into play — and it must be understood as relevant in economic and political terms with the following main phenomena:

• closure of borders — taking the form of strict lockdown or re-establishment of controls at the borders, taking different
• inner segregation, even directed against people who are already residents ion the respective country for a long time
• increased competition, also between previously allied actors — not least applying various economic mechanisms as the introduction of tariffs etc.
• also in tendency the opening of previously closed or strictly controlled borders, e.g. the relaxation of visa requirements
• reaching out for cooperation agreements.

An interesting facet in this context is the — in part existing — confrontation between Europe and the USA, where the remarkable part is that the USA claim, explicitly made by Rubio during the Munich Security Conference, that the strategy of the USA would be the true defender of European values (see https://www.hrug.legal/?p=829). Remarkable is … that this claim is in fact justified; in other words, the strategy of a harsh orientation on securing national interest is in fact a reflection of the fundamental values — this can be traced back to the birth of the modern individual during the renaissance, followed by the homo oeconomicus as child of the aboriginal inhabitant of the night-watch-state that supported the Wealth of the Nation.

So we are back, looking at the proposal of the predatory state. As important as it is to mark the serious threat of the current state of “nationalist global affairs” — be it as threat from warmongers or of forces that want to gain, regain and/or maintain a hegemonic position. However, it must be emphasised that it is not a matter of personalities. Instead, the global constellation developed a dynamic that must be recognised as foundation on which the tension had to develop. Talking about the geopolitical constellation must be corrected in this light — correct is to speak of a geoeconomics constellation and, when looking at (human) rights, this means to accept a hierarchy. More specifically we must analyse the international constellation in the light of • ongoing inequalities, • the utilisation of such inequalities in order to establish dependencies and • this way further the maintenance of the development of underdevelopment.
In the light of the changed positions of the various regions — especially those that had been at the “weak end of economic performance” — its must be questioned if the “old strategy” will work.

The fact, that the previously supportive agencies withdraw their backing must be seen as indicator that the path we have chosen may be doomed to failure.