It is not over yet: “China” is seen as major threat for “the West” — a change of mind, a shift in the cognitive process stands behind the use of inverted commas. Especially with the second Trump-administration the divide of the West itself is becoming increasingly a topic — “especially with the second Trump administration” means that it is not a fundamentally new development but a new state of awareness, consisting of following aspects:
Since some time we witness a growing re-regionalisation and even re-nationalisation in Europe — despite or perhaps because of the enlargement of the EU, the cohesiveness is becoming increasingly fragile. Core active nationalist/regionalist/separatist movements can be found in Catalonia and the Basque Country (Spain), Scotland (UK), and Flanders (Belgium), not unlikely candidates to become new states; a broader scope suggests a range up to 100 separatist movements, including numerous regional movements across countries like Italy (e.g., Veneto, Sardinia), France (e.g., Corsica), Germany (e.g., Bavaria) and the United Kingdom (e.g., Wales, Cornwall).
Even if splitting up along any of these lines is unlikely, it is an undeniably sign for the zeitgeist. There is seemingly a paradox: “Europe” claims that it must stand united against the US and the rest of the world. To be more precise, it is about Europe claiming supremacy over the US in order to become competitive (again) with the rest of the world. There are some interesting points that remain commonly unnoticed:
1. The beauty and the beast
EUrope, in particular the “culturally central member states”, namely Greece, Italy but also France, to some extent Germany as central successor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicae) [it must be stated that today’s designations are not identical with the historical designations while it is also worthwhile to mention that the Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicae is in some respect still alive: The Hapsburg-family has still meaningful positions on the political stage; the Thurn&Taxis family owns tremendous property: Germany’s largest privately owned forest, extensive property portfolio, business investments], claim to have a globally superior role when it comes to values and morals — it is remarkable that this claim existed for Europe, notwithstanding the era, notwithstanding the fact that crusades and two world-wars had been systematic part and consequence of this European value system. According to this world view, great civilisations never existed outside of Europe — everything there had been considered to be brutish, primitive, underdeveloped and in need of some “tuition”.
2. Equalising moral and ethical values, political standards and competitiveness
This supposed superiority stands also behind the equation of superiority and competitiveness.
3. Europe versus a specified “rest of the world”
Even if “Europe” considers itself as seemingly weak, though in reality strong — a modified David versus Goliath story — it focuses currently on
- making America European again
- competing with China
- On the one hand by gaining economic supremacy
- on the other hand, claiming to play the role of a missionary, defending the ultimate global value system
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Especially the first and the third point are in fact not primarily a matter of China- and-the-rest-of-the-world-bashing; instead, here we are concerned with admitting the own weakness, the fact that European capitalism is lagging behind. • The US can still profit from a major advantage, namely the currency advantage (see Kishore Mahbubani: “Has China Won?”; 2020; passim) — at the end of the day this is the success of a paper tiger, lacking a sustainable foundation. • European polities and economies are suffering from the fact that there had not been and is not a competitive system in place — * for a long time the “European model” could maintain some success, competing against the USSR and the related countries and also leaving the so-called threshold countries behind; * with this and also for a long time the powerful EU member states thought they could rest on their past laurels * while the polities faced situations during which federalism increasingly undermined political effectiveness and efficiency * and the so-called threshold countries gained economic and political strength/advantage. — All this is stated in a descriptive way, without qualifying the one or the other system as being better or stronger; such assessment that must be left to the reader.
However, equally meant to be a factual statement but in this case also a biased one is the following — referring to a recent debate of the Kiel Institute China Initiative. Roughly a position that had been brought forwards had been about assessing China’s role in the world — part of the argument: China would claim to re-establish a “historical position”, followed by the remark that the historical period of such restoration had not been specified. This is of special interest as it shows the use of two standards:
Europe can claim to have a great immaculate history and civilisation — there is no mention of slavery, crusades, wars that originated in European countries … .
In this view, the rest of the world doesn’t have anything comparable — great civilisations outside of Europe as Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China, Peru are forgotten — and at most it is conceded that there were certain “civilised phases”, but these are classified as exceptions.
So, in short we are witnessing the following fundamental line:
- the good West
- though slightly disrupted by the reborn American Wild-West
- standing against the generally threatening East, in particular China
- though some exceptional phases, characterised as civilised competition, combined with unfair play, may be admitted …
- … and must be countered by recognising the clandestine hostility and taking respective measures even if it can be only by way of limiting the acceptance omission a specific area
- all this going hand in hand with ignoring the rest, especially Africa and South-America.
The fact that the previously supportive agencies withdraw their backing must be seen as indicator that the path we have chosen may be doomed to failure. Of course, it is a matter of East and West, the competition and even confrontation of systems. However, here the main interest is a different one:
- Obviously, comparative historiography requires the use of “equal standards” — this is easily said and can on one level easily set in place. Obviously this requirement is in practice not applied when we look at today’s geopolitical scenario; at the same time it is not as easy as it seems to be: In the different contexts even some core terms cannot be simply applied/translated. Tacit meaning requires very careful handling, looking for the actual meaning, developing an understanding of meaning-generating context . In other words, and taking an example: sometimes equality is about accepting inequality.
- The geopolitical setting is the seedbed for further eroding the international/global political order. Membership in and the acceptance of obligations towards organisations as the United Nations and related institutions. The massive financial crisis due to states not living up to their commitments goes hand with the dominance of private investment, resulting in a quasi-privatisation of the institutions.
So, in conclusion the question east versus west may evolve as another question, in fact a set of questions being more central: public versus private AND acceptance of commitment versus reinterpreting (global) polities handled as matter of arbitrariness.